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ABSTRACT, KEYWORDS AND JEL CODES 
This dissertation aims to identify and compare the determinants of products exports 
from Brazil, Chile and Mexico, seeing that their intensive margin exports have evolved 
differently. Data analysis and time series ordinary least square (OLS) models from 1990 
up to the present allow us to infer which variables explain the greater picture. The results 
suggest that the most relevant determinant to achieve a diversified export basket is the 
shift on the production from commodities and primary goods to manufacturing. The 
empirical analysis also indicates that variables such as exchange rate, institution quality, 
credit, and remoteness play relevant roles on diversification. Curiously, trade 
liberalization, while relevant to the three countries, favoured specialization in the 
Brazilian and Chilean cases, and diversification in the Mexican case, presumably due to 
its access to the North American market and the maquiladoras’ cheap production process. 
 
KEYWORDS: International trade; export diversification; structural economic 
transformation; Latin America. 
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EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION DETERMINANTS – WHERE DO BRAZIL, CHILE AND 
MEXICO DIVERGE? 
By Hugo Mello 
The objective of this dissertation is to identify the main determinants of 
intensive margin export diversification of Brazil, Chile and Mexico, making 
use of OLS models, literature review and data analysis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over time, the terms of trade (TOT) of primary goods deteriorate, and the exports of 
the countries that depend on them become more vulnerable and volatile. Consequently, 
the pursue of a diversified export agenda towards manufacture good has become a goal 
for many of these countries. It is a way to develop production and therefore, to create 
internal benefits, such as knowledge spill over, more dynamic domestic markets, 
backward and forward linkages and job creation, among others. 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico are, per se, three of the most influential Latin American 
countries (LAC) and with global relevance when it comes to aspects such as geopolitics 
and market size – the first two are in the G20 group, and emerging markets groups such 
as  BRICS and MINT1 have become significantly more relevant since the 2008 crisis. 
Historically, since the colonial times (1500-1822), they share similarities that stretch from 
social characteristics and language to economic policy agendas. The factors in common 
binding LAC are much stronger than those of Africa, Asia or Europe (Bulmer-Thomas, 
2003). As the author points out, the region has been quite stable since independence and 
its borders have changed much less than elsewhere in the past 150 years. And in spite of 
Brazil being the sole Southern Common Market (Mercosur) member-state, the economic 
integration encompasses all three countries in some way. 
Throughout the 20th century they tried to diversify their production and exports – just 
as many other countries have done worldwide – meeting successful outcomes along the 
way, and also dealing with the costs of some failed projects. At the end of the last century 
they pursued similar policies, such as markets’ liberalization and the stabilization of 
prices. Their exports, however, did not respond similarly. Chile specialized in ores and 
minerals, with great share on copper; Mexico exported more manufactured and less 
 
1 Acronyms for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; and for Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and 
Turkey respectively, two groups of the major emerging markets. 
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primary goods; and in spite of the fact that Brazil did not show a turning point during this 
period, its exports indicate a tendency to re-commoditization since the mid-1990s, that 
increased rapidly and led the country to achieve one of the biggest foreign exchange 
reserves in the world in the 2000s. 
At this stage, my objective is to examine the determinants of their diversification of 
exports since 1990, capturing a period of liberalization and price stabilization. What 
determinants are more relevant when it comes to their exports’ products diversification?  
The determinants of their export diversification will be acknowledged by using some 
ordinary least squares (OLS) models. The empirical investigations on the topic are usually 
done through panel models, in order to understand what variables have been central to a 
group of countries – such as the least developed countries, or countries from a specific 
region, for example. In this study, however, the objective is to determine not only the 
common variables between countries, but also the distinct variables, since they are similar 
but have shown distinct paths in the last 30 years. Is there any relevant variable that will 
us that? 
Stylized facts about individual countries will enrich further investigations and help 
guide future studies about this, or related, topics. Filling the gap of research on export 
diversification of specific countries will contribute to the literature, which is mostly 
focused on panel data analysis, in view of the fact that there are actual conclusions about 
three relevant emerging countries with distinct exports evolution. 
After this introduction, Chapter Two reviews the literature, broadly looking at the 
export diversification and more specifically at topics on the subject about each country. 
It will also address export diversification and include some data analysis that will enable 
an apprehension of each countries’ reality. The quantitative analysis is made in Chapter 
Three, and the data and methodology are discussed before the result analysis. In Chapter 
Four, the final remarks and conclusions of this dissertation are made. There follows 
References and Appendices, the latter with some notes, charts and tables. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An extremely specialized export basket is rarely found in a developed country, but 
that is not the case with most developing countries (Agosin et al, 2011). Indeed, the 
development of a country is associated with its Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI)2, and 
there are cases when this association is extremely negative. 
After the failure of the export-led commodities-based growth model in Latin America 
(LA) – from shortly after independence, largely in the first quarter of the 19th century, 
and until the Great Depression, when their prices fell glaringly –, the region aimed at 
implementing the import substitution development model. After the Second World War, 
some recently industrialized countries in East Asia organized themselves pointing at an 
export-led growth based on labour-intensive manufacture products and diversifying their 
export portfolio towards products of higher added value. Over time, those Asian 
economies became internationally competitive and surpassed the LA standard of living, 
which was much higher than the former during the 19th century (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the Asian case is not uniform, and indeed we find opposite examples of 
development strategy in Asia and therefore, contrasting consequences. Studwell (2013) 
confronts the cases of Asian countries that promoted export-oriented production (such as 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and recent China) and those that have not done so (such as 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and The Philippines). Next, he contrasts how the first group has 
developed and grown, or develops and grows, much faster than the second. Their distinct 
approach to external trade made a great difference: while the first group generated 
conglomerates and became internationally competitive with the carrot and stick approach, 
the second chose the national champion approach and ended up with non-competitive 
firms dependent on foreign technology. 
Although Ricardo suggested specialization of production according to comparative 
advantage3, and the Heckscher-Ohlin model implied that endowments should determine 
a country’s international trade4, at least since the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis5, LACs have 
often tried to diversify their export portfolio towards added value products. In sum, while 
 
2 UNCTAD Stat (2019). Author’s own calculations. 
3 See Ricardo, David (1817), on Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 
4 See Ohlin, Bertil (1933), on Interregional and International Trade. 
5 It argues natural resource-based countries’ TOT deteriorates in the long term due to a fall of relative 
prices of commodities to industrial products. 
HUGO MELLO  EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION DETERMINANTS -
WHERE DO BRAZIL, CHILE AND MEXICO DIVERGE? 
4 
 
according to Ricardo a country should specialize its production, and exports, and 
Heckscher-Ohlin did not worry about the diversification per se, and rather accumulation, 
Prebisch pointed out that diversification was very relevant to achieve development. And 
according to de Ferranti et al. (2002), the highly concentrated structure of export revenues 
is a recurrent concern of LACs, since it could deteriorate TOT, diminish economic 
growth, and lead to economic and income volatility, among other points. Even when 
suggesting a different path, Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin American 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) always emphasized the importance of international trade, 
just as preceding theories have also done so. In his own words: 
The more active LA’s foreign trade, the grater the possibility of increasing productivity by 
means of intensive capital formation. The solution does not lie in growth at the expense of 
foreign trade, but in knowing how to extract, from continually growing foreign trade, the 
elements that will promote economic development.  
In: Prebisch (1950), p. 2. 
It is relevant to decompose export diversification into intensive and extensive margins 
(export basket value distribution and greater number of partners respectively), as several 
authors have done so (e.g., Evernett & Venables, 2002; Brenton & Newfarmer, 2007; 
Cadot et al., 2011a; Baumann, 2013). The growing number of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) 
has caused a geographic spread of trade, a phenomenon that has brought the bilateral trade 
down to much lower numbers for many developing countries (Evernett & Venables, 
2002), and consequently expanding the extensive margin of several countries in the same 
direction.  In relation to the basket variety, Hausmann et al. (2007) concluded that if a 
country’s export basket is more similar to that of a rich country, the better it will perform. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the development of extensive margin plays a decisive role 
in a developing country’s sovereignty, my focus here is on the intensive margin, since it 
is the main component of export growth – some authors found a contribution as high as 
80 per cent (Cadot et al. 2011b). 
All in all, there are many positive outcomes from the intensive margin export 
diversification. The next paragraphs will briefly review three topics.  Firstly, since this 
work is about three developing countries, I would like to point out the Dutch disease, a 
consequence of export concentration. If a resource-rich country does not diversify its 
production, the structure of its economy combines aspects such as real exchange rate 
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appreciation and higher imports, compromising the Balance of Payments (BoP) 
(Venables, 2016), and therefore export variety reduces exposure to external shocks and 
macroeconomic volatility (De Ferranti et al., 2002; Agosin et al., 2011). Batista (2004) 
concluded in his analysis that exporter countries with low share of resource-based 
products tended to perform better than those with high shares. Sachs and Warner (1999) 
noticed from LACs that primary goods dependency did not accelerate future growth, 
rather the opposite, while Husmann et al. (2007)’s results show that exports of goods of 
higher productivity is linked to higher levels of economic growth. De Ferranti et al. (2002) 
link export concentration to institutional failure, the latter a result of large supplies of 
natural resources. Another interesting aspect to highlight is the result found by Lederman 
& Maloney (2003), that while natural resource abundance affects growth positively, 
export concentration hampers it.  
Secondly, diversification of the export basket contributes to economic growth and 
development through several means, such as fewer volatile earnings (Agosin et al, 2011; 
Osakwe et al, 2018), reduced macroeconomic volatility (Agosin et al, 2011), 
manufactured goods quality improvement (Osakwe et al, 2018), structural transformation 
(Hesse, 2008), per capital income growth (Hesse, 2008), higher gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Osakwe et al, 2018), productivity (Agosin et al, 2011; Hausmann et al, 2007) and 
employment levels (Osakwe et al, 2018), among others. Besides that, Berg et al. (2012) 
argue that a sophisticated export basket contributes to future sustained growth, since it 
pushes innovation and makes the economy more flexible to shocks. Grancay et al. (2015), 
however, concluded that export of commodities might lead to higher future growth, but 
only if their prices are on the rise. They studied the period 2004-2013, encompassing the 
commodities’ prices boom. In this specific case a country can achieve higher growth rates 
and enhance its TOT by exporting commodities, but when their prices are stable, the 
export of more sophisticated goods is also the best path, according to the authors. 
Thirdly, causes and consequences of intensive margin exports diversification have 
been analyzed by many authors. As a country grows and develops, it tends to diversify 
its exports until it reaches a specific level of per capita income6, when it specializes again 
(Imbs & Wacziarg, 2002; Cadot et al., 2011a). Empirically positive effects of human 
 
6 Cadot et al. (2011a) estimated it at PPP$ 25 000.  
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capital and institutions development were found in the diversification of exports (Agosin 
et al., 2011; Osakwe et al., 2018), and Hesse (2008) noticed that it was related to better 
TOT and higher GDP per capita growth. The volatility of real exchange rate, in contrast, 
leads to concentration of exports (de Ferranti et al., 2002). Osakwe et al. (2018) found 
some cases of trade liberalization related to export diversification, while Agosin et al. 
(2011) consider it leading to export concentration and no relation of overvaluation and 
financial development, measured by credit to non-banking sector. Brazil was one of the 
poorest LAC in the 1920s but by the 1970s it had become one of the richest, due to its 
production and export transformation, delinking itself from the world economy (Bulmer-
Thomas, 2003).  
In sum, diversifying exports are essential to reduce a country’s export dependency, 
and it is necessary to aim the production structure towards a larger share of greater added 
value goods in order to achieve it (Osakwe & Kilolo, 2018).  
 
2.1. Looking at Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
With respect to Brazil’s exports, Baumann (2013)’s results show that it has not been 
able to conquer developed markets (as China and India have) and that only about one-
tenth of its export growth is made of new products. However, comparing to other LACs, 
Brazil disposes of a well-diversified export basket and it is responsible for the region’s 
concentration in resource-based high-tech manufactures (Santos-Paulino, 2010), although 
Bastista (2004) ranks the country in third, after Mexico and Chile, with regards to the 
share of high differentiated resource-based products. Brazilian exported primary goods 
are classified as homogenous, and so the composition effects7 tend to be negative (Batista, 
2004). This means Brazilian resource-based exports tend to be price takers and account 
for 84 percent of the total Brazilian exports, according to the author. Canuto et al. (2013) 
consider that Brazil can explore its export growth taken that it already overcame the huge 
initial fixed costs, and earned its recognition as a global trader with diversified industrial 
structures and natural resources. During the decade of 2000-10, the authors found an 
increase in the share of primary goods exports and a decline in the share of high 
 
7 Composition effect is the effect caused by trade liberalization, generating re-allocation of resources 
towards products the country has comparative advantages.  
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technological products due not only to the commodities prices boom, but also to the poor 
performance of more sophisticated industries. 
The extensive margin is very concentrated in the Brazilian case, which relies greatly 
on the regional market, even with long experience in export promotion ideas (Baumann, 
2013). Vieira and Reis (2018) found Brazilian exports highly influenced by income and 
size of the trade partner’s consumer market. Therefore, a broader extensive margin would 
secure Brazil from downturns in those respective partners. Brazil’s low intensive margin 
might have serious implications concerning the region economic performance and also in 
terms of competition with other emerging countries – such as India and China (Santos-
Paulino, 2008). The author points out that the fast and dynamic growth of specialized 
exports compared to other exports might lead to higher concentration. 
State instruments promoting export diversification in Chile had positive impacts 
concerning both new markets and new products in the 1990s (Alvarez & Crespi, 2000). 
The authors identify firm technological innovation, organizational management 
innovation, technological improvement, among other state instruments, when it seemed 
that Chile was moving towards a change in its export agenda. In the 2000s, however, 
according to Coldeco’s8 chairman, the increasing demand for copper from emerging 
markets in order to sustain urbanization (China in particular) changed the country’s 
economy, and the bust of its price in 2011 brought down the Chilean GDP growth with it 
(FT, 2017). The specialization of LA is complex given its heterogeneity, but Chile 
classifies as an outlier concerning this aspect since it is highly specialized in copper 
(Santos-Paulino, 2010). In general, countries that have gained market share by exporting 
more commodities, as Chile has done, have also suffered from it (Batista, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the author argues that the Chilean case is unconventional: most of its 
commodities exports are classified as differentiated or highly differentiated products, and 
therefore the composition effect tends to be positive. This means that Chilean resource-
based exports volume might increase by cutting down the relative price (differentiated), 
or that the international competition of these resource-based exports is not mainly based 
on price differences (high-differentiated). Jointly, differentiated and high-differentiated 
account for 62 percent of the total.  
 
8 The state-owned copper company. 
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that Chile gave up on diversifying its exports. 
Agosin and Bravo-Ortega (2009) investigated some promising new opportunities that 
have gained importance over the last years – such as wine, blueberry and pork. While 
Asian countries remolded their comparative advantage to manufactures, Chile aimed at 
the food and forestry sectors instead of the manufacturing sector. Agosin and Bravo-
Ortega (2009) say that in 2005, however, they still represented less than 10 percent of the 
Chilean non-copper exports, as they did in 2018 according to the author’s own 
calculations. Naturally, beating mineral based exports might be very hard, taking into 
account that a huge share of the world’s copper and lithium known reserves are in the 
Atacama Desert – thirty and fifty percent respectively (FT, 2017). On the other hand, 
Castillo and Neto (2016) argue that Chile was as specialized in 2014 as in 1990, since 
primary and natural resources accounted for 89 percent of its total exports in both years. 
According to the authors, the Chilean deindustrialization begun during its own early 
stages. Unfortunately, none of the recent industrial attempts succeeded. 
Mexico’s exports experienced a significant increase in variety in all the industries, 
especially after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Feenstra & Kee, 
2007), and it accounts for most of the LA manufactured products, given the labor-
intensive export-oriented production supplying the NAFTA market (Santos-Paulino, 
2010). Batista (2004) highlights Mexico as the country with comparative advantage in 
high differentiated products, while LA excluding Mexico reveals some comparative 
advantage in price taker products. The author affirms that Mexico is the top first LAC, 
holding a very large share in high differentiated products. Pateka and Tamberi (2011) 
found empirically that a country’s size, location and trade conditions are the most robust 
explanatory variables of a country’s export diversification. All these three variables 
corroborate in favor of the Mexican export diversification, since it is a large country, close 
to a huge consumer market and a partner of liberal trade agreements – such as NAFTA 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
The work of Castillo and Neto (2016) treats Mexico as a special case among the main 
LA economies (along with Argentina, Brazil and Chile) – Mexico has not shown 
deindustrialization and has reduced primary goods’ exports while medium and high-
technology exports’ share grew. They emphasize the great importance of the 
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maquiladoras9 in this process, as do Sánchez et al. (2017), who go deeper and point out 
the Mexican risk of becoming a “maquila-dominated economy”. 
 
2.2. Understanding the countries 
Following the presentation of the broad idea, it is important to understand the 
countries’ relative position in LA. Concerning GDP, these three countries together sum 
up circa 65% of all LA & Caribbean production, in which Brazil and Mexico alone 
account for around 61% of the region. Chile disposes of a much more moderate economy, 
although its GDP per capita ranks the highest among them. Considering over thirty 
countries, the three countries account for over half of population and land area. Brazil is 
the most populated of LA & Caribbean countries and Mexico the second, 33 and 20 
percent of total respectively (210 and 125 million people). As regards land area, 
approximately 42 percent of the region is Brazilian, and 10 percent of it is Mexican. Chile 
represents about 3 percent of both population (18 million people) and land area10.  
 
9 A maquiladora is a factory which operates under favourable tariff programs. Inputs are bought duty-
free, and outputs sold into the North American market under the NAFTA agreement.  
10 WB (2019b). Author’s own calculations.  







1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Brazil Chile Mexico Latin America & Caribbean
WTO and NAFTA 
Source: UN Comtrade (2019). Author’s own calculations. 
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Export to GDP ratio is illustrated in Figure 1 – Mexico has grown its ratio, while 
Chile’s ratio booms along with commodities prices, and Brazil has kept it low. I highlight 
the Mexican case after 1994, when the FTAs came into practice. 
The exchange rate plays a key role when it comes to international trade, since it is the 
BoP adjustment variable. The World Bank’s real effective exchange rate (REER) Index 
and the export to GDP ratio correlations do not behave in the same manner in each 
country. While the Chilean REER and Export to GDP ratio correlation index from 1990 
to 2017 is -0,27, the Mexican is -0,47 and the Brazilian is as high as -0,7811. Hence, the 
Brazilian Real fluctuations are highly correlated with its export to GDP ratio, which 
conform with the idea of the currency’s overvaluation after the Real Plan – indeed, Figure 
1 indicates clearly how the devaluation after 1998 is related to a higher ratio.  
The analyzes of merchandising exports (Figure 2) highlight the peculiarity of the 
Chilean and Mexican cases. More than half of Chile’s merchandise exports has been of 
ores and metals. Brazil stays closer to LA & Caribbean’s numbers, and Mexico’s even 
less, around 3 percent. On the other hand, manufacture merchandise exports in Mexico 
account for about 76 percent of total merchandise exports, while Chile’s draws near the 
14 percent mark. Mexican manufactures exports grew significantly in the beginning of 
the 1990s. Brazilian manufactures exports suffered a noteworthy fall in 25 years, from 52 
to 37 percent. LAC are usually known for their foods exports, a usually volatile sector, 
which Mexico has kept low in percentage of its total merchandise exports. In 1990, Brazil, 
Chile and LA & Caribbean exported about a quarter of their total merchandise exports in 
foods. In Brazil, this share grew and almost reached 40 percent of total merchandise 
exports, thanks to soya beans exports, as Jerkins (2015) analyses. Chile’s foods export 
share went down after 2004 given the percentage increase of Ores and Metals. During the 
2000s, the LA & Caribbean food exports percentage went down as well, but it grew again 
after 2014, when some commodities prices fell – in 2017 it represented 26 percent of the 
total, against 24 percent in 1990. It can be observed that for LA & Caribbean there was 
not an export structural change, as all three subsectors analyzed here maintained almost 
stable percentages.  
 
11 WB (2019a). Author’s own calculations. 
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FIGURE 2 – Commodities, Foods and Manufactures Exports 
Another interesting point on Figure 2 is the export value index, that shows that exports 
from Brazil and Chile grew much faster. It is not a coincidence that they were more 
volatile while Mexican exports maintained its growth more stable – Brazilian 
merchandise exports are mainly foods; Chile counts with ores and metals; and Mexico 
merchandise portfolio is mostly manufacture goods. In a matter of comparison, Brazilian 
and Chilean coefficient of variation is considerably higher than the Mexican (0,67; 0,68 
and 0,59 respectively12). 
Their main partners’ configurations are summed up in Appendices Figure 11, which 
reflect their exports in an interesting way. Until the 2000s, the United States of America 
(USA) was Brazil’s largest partner, accounting for about a fifth of all its exports, but since 
2009 China has increased its share, which accounted for 26 percent of the total in 2018. 
Thus, not surprisingly, the products that China demands took some of the Brazilian 
 
12 Author’s own calculations. Data retrieved from UN Comtrade (2019). 
Source: UN Comtrade (2019). Author’s own calculations. 
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manufactures export share. The Argentinian trade partnership was consolidated right after 
Mercosur came into practice (1991), and it consists mostly of high added value Brazilian 
exports, being the largest shares transportation and machines along the years (OEC, 
2019). Chile’s range also switched from USA and Japan (countries that used to represent 
around 30 percent of the total of export value) to China, which accounted for as much as 
34 percent in 2018. Brazilian imports were quite stable, comprising around 5 percent of 
the total Chilean exports. All those four countries buy mostly metal and mineral products 
from Chile (OEC, 2019).  
If China’s share of a quarter and a third of Brazilian and Chilean exports respectively 
is already too much, the USA’s share of Mexican exports achieved an astonishing share 
of 89 percent in 2004, averaging 82 percent throughout the whole period. During all the 
NAFTA existence, Canada has been the second largest Mexican importer. Going deeper 
in analyzing the Mexican-USA trade, we can see that the Mexican export diversification 
is nothing more than a reflection of the Mexican export diversification to the USA, 
showcasing a Mexican export dependence. As Figure 3 below shows, manufacture 
exports to the USA have grown from 46 to 88 percent of the total, gaining space over the 
foods and ores and minerals sectors – the same trends seen in Figure 2. Hence, the 
remoteness index for Mexico is much lower than for Brazil and Chile, averaging 17, 70 
and 78 respectively13.  
FIGURE 3 – Mexican Exports to USA 
  
 
13 Author’s own calculations. The applied methodology is suggested by UN (2015) using trade and distance 
between countries. If a country is physically close to its major export destinations, then the index tends to 
be lower. Details can be found in the Appendices. 
Source: UN Comtrade. Author’s own calculations 
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After comparing the countries among 
themselves, it is interesting to compare 
them worldwide. The diversification 
indexes in Figure 4 measure how diverse 
the export pattern of a country is from the 
world pattern going from 0 to 1. From 1995 
to 2005, Brazil came closer to the world pattern, as its index decreased, but then it 
increased again to even higher levels following the country’s recent crisis and some 
commodities prices fell once more. Chile was by far the furthest from the world pattern, 
although its index has decreased over the period and it is the only country showing 
consistence. The Mexican index did not change much, and it is the closest to world 
pattern. Unfortunately, there are no data available from before 1995, when Mexico would 
have probably shown its improvement. 
The internal market plays a fundamental role in determining the export agenda. After 
conquering national market, enterprises are more likely to become internationally 
competitive and to export, just as the Asian cases presented by Amsden (2004). Countries 
such as Brazil and Mexico, with huge internal market, are able to exploit it in this sense. 
It is necessary, however, to give incentives and limits – like the carrot and stick approach 
applied to Japanese keiretsu and South Korean chaebol.  
Thus, it is relevant to observe each country’s production by sector. Figure 5, bellow, 
illustrates the production as percentage of GDP of agriculture and industry sectors14. The 
latter is divided in three categories: mining, manufacturing, and construction. In both 
three countries, the service sector has become more relevant to overall production, 
especially in Brazil (the only country where it represents over 70 percent). As Araújo et 
al. (2012) state, Brazilian economy has been going through a deindustrialization since the 
1990s structural change, and a deepening of the financialization process along with strong 
exchange rate appreciation process, declining the share of industrial added value 
production – the process seen in Figure 5, as a huge change in 199415. In Chile’s 
production we can easily note the mining sector gaining relevance over the manufacture 
 
14 The remaining GDP production is from the service sector. 
15 In 1994 the Real Plan was introduced and the new currency very appreciated, assuming a value close 
to the US dollar (BCB, 2019). Along with liberalization policies, the national industries could not sustain 
themselves. 
FIGURE 4 – World Pattern Diversification 
Source: UNCTAD (2019) 
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sector during all the period and a persistent declining of agriculture. During the 2000s 
copper price inflation, the mining sector surpassed 20 percent of production. In Mexico, 
however, the national production did not change abruptly (as it did in Brazil in 1994 or 
in Chile in the 2000s), but the mining sector fell considerably – from 12 to 7 percent – 
and the manufacture sector maintained almost a fifth of the country’s production. 
FIGURE 5 – Production by Sector (percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Another relevant data is the evolution of dispersion indexes – here I show the HHI, 
as well as the Theil and Gini indexes16. Their increase indicates a more specilizaed 
intensive margin export portfolio. The indexes suggest that Brazilian and Chilean exports 
became more specialized, while Mexican diversified during the period. Although there is 
indeed concentration of the Chilean export value on fewer goods (and therefore more 
specialized export basket), it does not mean that there is a change in the structure of 
production or that the country is exporting less manufactured goods. In fact, it was the 
opposite. In the Appendices Figure 10 it becomes clear that even though the share of 
Chilean manufactured goods decreased during the prices boom, its total value increased.  
 
16 The indexes and their methodology are explained in the Appendices. 
Source: UNCTAD Stat (2019). Author’s own calculations. 
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FIGURE 6 – Concentration Indexes 
The Brazilian concentration index seems to be the most stable and the country saw its 
intensive margin exports concentrate, evolving relatively slowly comparing to the other 
two countries. Great shocks, such as the currency reforms of 1994 and 1998, the Asian 
financial crisis and the 2000s commodities boom could have represented a more 
significant turning point, but they have not. The biggest LAC did suffer structural changes 
after those shocks, but its huge production was not as proportionally affected as other 
economies. Apace with this, the recent Brazilian downturn in manufactures is also due to 
a switch in this sector’s trade balance, which fell from surplus in 2005 to a large deficit 
in 2012, a period when China’s growth impacted Brazil directly and indirectly – buying 
more Brazilian commodities17, but less of its manufactures and harshly competing 
 
17 The major Brazilian exports are soya bens and iron ore, products China purchases more than half 
and around quarter of total worldwide output respectively (Jerkins, 2015). 
Source: UN Comtrade (2019). Author’s own calculations. 
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internationally (Jerkins, 2015). The soya beans price more than doubled between 2006 
and 2008, and in 2016 it was almost half of it was in 201218. During the period between 
1990 and 2011, Brazilian sectors such as agriculture, primary commodities and natural 
resources saw higher labor productivity and investment levels, factors which corroborate 
the idea of premature deindustrialization (Kirsch, 2018), that is when a mid-income 
country structural transformation lacks an inter-sectorial reallocation gain. Therefore, if 
the goal is to achieve more intensive margin export diversification, the sectors of higher 
added value production should be the ones with more resources and productivity gains, 
and not as it has been done. Brazil’s Theil Index varied between 2,04 and 2,85 during this 
period with an average of 2,36, and from 2004 to 2011 it grew year after year, showing it 
was not immune to the commodities’ prices boom. 
Chile’s Theil Index went up and down during the same period, seeming more volatile. 
There were efforts to diversify the country’s exports in 2000 through industrial policy 
focusing on efficiency gains and innovation, which generated mixed results, but only until 
2004 (Varas, 2012). From the copper inflation – seen as valorization in the eyes of an 
exporter – derived a huge fiscal revenue growth (Varas, 2012), in a manner that it became 
difficult to maintain the focus on diversification – in 2008 the price of copper was five 
times higher than in 199918. The funds allocated to science, technology and innovation, 
however, did increase during that time as the author shows, even though it does not yet 
impact the export diversification, and in fact does not even come close to that. The impact 
of the copper price boom is visually clear in the charts (Figure 6). For a change to take 
place, a deeper reconfiguration is necessary, as Ffrench-Davis (2017) proposes – 
economic policies (such as fiscal, monetary, credit and exchange rate policies) should be 
countercyclical if the goal is to diminish the volatility that comes with both copper exports 
and financial markets; and support to small and medium enterprises through capital 
market reform to facilitate access to financing. The index fluctuated between 3,15 and 
3,88 with an average of 3,46, the highest range among the three countries. All indexes 
have been on the rise during the period, as have the Chilean FTA agreements (Figure 12 
in Appendices). 
 
18 FRED (2019). Author’s own calculations. 
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The Mexican case is also peculiar. Before 1995 its exports were much more 
specialized than they later became. It is interesting to compare the manufacture chart in 
Figure 2 with its indexes (Figure 6) – the larger the share of manufacture exports in total 
merchandise exports, the lower are the concentration indexes. Although Mexico is now 
in many FTAs (Figure 12 in Appendices), NAFTA certainly had a huge positive impact 
towards its export diversification, since it turned possible that a cheaper production 
conquered the USA market. The maquiladoras surely affect the export diversification 
indexes as they represent around half of Mexico’s manufactured exports from the 
beginning of NAFTA up to 200619 (Blecker, 2014), but it does not mean that the country 
is benefiting from the promises that NAFTA brought with it, and it is not only because 
maquiladoras have a limited positive effect within the country itself. As the author points 
out, it has not generated as many Mexican qualified jobs as expected; the country did not 
converge to the USA per capita income; as their trade grew, it became more USA 
dependent20; and all its manufacture production still relies on very expensive intermediate 
goods, which account for about as high as three-quarters of the export value when it 
comes to the maquiladoras. In 2012, the average Mexican manufacturing hourly wage 
was 16 percent of the USA’s, an even larger gap than from 1993. The USA dependence 
is likely to be one of the main reasons Mexico has been in a pursuit of FTAs since 
NAFTA’s origin (Villarreal, 2017). In that sense, Mexico’s Theil ranged between 2,21 
and 3,25 (in 1990), averaging 2,52. Since 2010 it is the most diversified export portfolio 
among the countries, surpassing Brazil’s index. After a very fast diversification in the 
beginning of 1990s, there was a specialization from late 1990s until the end of the period. 
This second movement is softer through the HHI index and much more significant by the 
Gini index, in a way that their trend lines have opposite slopes, even though manufactures 
are still the largest share of Mexican merchandise exports. 
All in all, the three indexes show that Chilean exports are much more specialized than 
the others, and that Mexico became the most diversified country, since Brazilian exports 
have slowly – but considerably – specialized over time. 
  
 
19 The last year with available data for maquiladoras alone. 
20 Besides the extensive margin export high specialization (Figure 11), around 47 per cent of Mexican 
imports are from USA alone. (Villarreal, 2014) 
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3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
The generally chosen method to analyze the export diversification determinants is the 
Generalized Method Moments (GMM) (e.g., Agosin et al., 2011; Balavac, 2012; Osakwe 
& Kilolo, 2018; among others). It is preferred over the OLS due to its suitability to 
dynamic panel models (Hoday, 2013). Here, however, the goal is not to estimate a panel 
model but to find similarities and differences between the three countries. Hence, the OLS 
models were calculated through IBM SPSS Statistics 24 and the results contrasted. This 
method was also applied by Osakwe et al. (2018) and Cadot et al. (2011b). 
 
3.1. Data Description 
Both Osakwe et al. (2018) and Cadot et al. (2011b) chose the Theil Index as the 
dependent variable for export diversification. There are not as many investigations 
analyzing the HHI variance, but some authors such as Elhairaika & Mbate (2014) chose 
this index. The Theil Index achieved more robust results than the HHI and, as a result of 
its performance, it was selected to be the dependent variable. Besides that, it has 
advantages such as not to be bounded between 0 and 1 and to be less skewed (Mau, 2014).  
There were some independent variables common to both Osakwe et al. (2018) and 
Cadot et al. (2011b), such as GDP per capita, human capital, remoteness, infrastructure, 
institutions and trade. Besides that, tariffs, FDI, size of economy, preferential market 
access, and policy score were also considered. Apart from these, Agosin et al (2011), 
Osakwe & Kilolo (2018), Elhairaika & Mbate (2014) and Paterka & Tamberi (2011) also 
added financial development, investment, exchange rate volatility and overvaluation, and 
dummies for regional trade agreements and different levels of income per capita (since 
they calculated panel estimations).  
The chosen independent variables are summed up in Appendices Figure 13, and since 
it is not a panel model, the variables were chosen in accordance to the countries’ contexts 
and data availability. They were selected following the literature review and kept as they 
showed significance and matched the statistical criteria. In sum, two variables were 
considered for manufacture, commodities, and trade liberalization, given their relevance 
and statistic suitability. The increase of manufacture production and manufacture exports 
are expected to have a negative sign, due to its propensity to diversify exports, while the 
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mineral rents and natural resources rents as percentage of GDP tend to be positive and 
increase the concentration index. The literature has shown trade liberalization with both 
negative (e.g. Osakwe et al. (2018) and Perteka e Timberi (2011)) and positive signs (e.g. 
Agosin et al (2011)). Moreover, credit; education; institution quality; investment; 
exchange rate; and remoteness were also included in the models. Among these, exchange 
rate and remoteness are expected to have a positive sign – exports tend to specialize as 
the currency becomes more expensive and distance of major partners increases. All the 
remaining variables’ coefficient sign tend to be negative – more credit and investment are 
usually linked to more opportunity of rentability and production and, therefore, 
diversification; and education and institution quality are generally associated with better 
governance and opportunity, generating results in favor of diversification as well. 
 
3.2. Estimations and Analysis 
Before analyzing the results, we must check if they are trustworthy. All the models are 
significant, since the F test type I error probability is always less than 1 percent. There 
cannot be any correlation between two random errors, to ensure that the Durbin Watson 
(DW) test was taken for each model, where we expect a value close to 2. In all of them 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation among regression residuals was not rejected, and 
those in zone of indecision are satisfactory considering the scatterplots in Appendices 
(Figure 14), where we cannot find any clear correlation. The residuals are normally 
distributed, as Figure 15 in Appendices show. To guarantee that  there is no 
heteroskedasticity in the models, a different OLS was calculated for each model, where 
the residual square was the dependent variable, and a probability of type I error higher 
than 10 percent in the F test, that is, a large chance that any of the independent variables 
can explain the residuals’ variance simultaneously, would confirm homoscedasticity21. 
Finally, it was not found collinearity either, since the VIF tests were always smaller than 
10. It is important to point out that the independent variables for each model were chosen 
considering the collinearity – when it was found collinearity among two or more 
explanatory variables, they were separated into distinct models.  
 
21 Since the Brazilian Model B in Figure 8 presented a value of 0,06 – the only lower than 0,1 –, the 
error’s constant variances were checked through the Breusch-Pagan test and the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity was not rejected. 
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Considering that the models are from time series analysis for each individual country, 
the results tend not to be as precise and robust as panel data analysis. Nevertheless, 
identifying stylized facts for each country specifically enriches the understanding of each 
one of them, that have had similar – but not identical – paths. That being said, we can 
confirm that the results that follow below22 are robust in all the assumptions underlying 
the method of OLS23 and finally ask: how much of each country’s Theil Index is explained 
by those independent variables? Is there any difference among them after all? 
In Figure 7 there are three models for each country (Models 1, 2 and 3) where the 
target is the comparison between them. In the following figure each country has its own 
best results, also in three regressions (respectively Models A, B and C).
 
22 The models were run through backward method. Significant variables’ coefficients are from the last 
software’s automatic output, while the not significant variable’s values from the first one. 
23 All assumptions exposed by Gujarati & Porter (2008).  




FIGURE 7 – Joint OLS Estimations 




FIGURE 8 – Individual OLS Estimations 
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It is clear that in all three countries the higher the participation of manufactures in 
production as percentage of GDP, or the higher its share in total merchandise exports, the 
more diversified the export basket is. Accordingly, also in all three, the larger rents from 
mineral or all-natural resources as percentage of GDP, the more specialized the intensive 
margin exports. So, if they want to be less vulnerable to external shocks; to stabilize their 
international trade; to not have exchange rate or BoP pressure in times of disturbances; 
or any of the consequences of an imbalanced export portfolio, structure reforms which 
sectorial reallocation are towards more added value output will surely help them. All three 
countries had at least one proxy of manufacture data and one of commodity data 
significant at 1 percent. Model 3 indicates the impact of mineral rents are much stronger 
to Chile. Model 1 suggests Mexico’s Theil as taking the strongest impact of the 
manufacture production variable, while Model 2 implies Chile’s Theil. 
A higher REER means less external competitiveness and this proxy is positively 
significant for all of them. For Brazil, this explanatory variable was significant in all the 
used models, in accordance with the literature review and data analysis. 
As for institutional quality and remoteness, both Brazil and Mexico show significant 
coefficients with expected signs, but Chilean coefficients are not significant. In the 
Brazilian and Mexican regressions where remoteness is an explanatory variable, its p-
value is lower than 1 percent, showing robust evidence of significance. The closer the 
goods’ destination, the more diversified the exports, a reality that goes along with the 
Mexico-USA and Brazil-Mercosur (specially Argentina) trade relations. Thus, 
institutional quality and physical distance from importer has been relevant at least to the 
two large countries’ export diversification. 
Concerning education, Chile’s negative sign in more than one model corroborates with 
theory and literature review. Unfortunately, although in two models its sign is also 
negative in the Mexican case, there is one positive sign. Brazilian cases indicate a positive 
effect in Theil as well. Whilst there is a great variety of educational data at UNESCO 
(2019), it is not a simple task to find simultaneously complete dataset for these three 
countries during the period 1990-2018. As the results of the chosen proxy were significant 
in some cases, they were kept given the relevance and significance of education on the 
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topic, even with data missing, what may have affected the final results in some 
regressions. 
For investment and credit, negative signs were expected since they usually collaborate 
to a Theil’s fall in economic rationale. Chilean signs and significances are, again, as 
expected, and the increase of both independent variables help to diversify the exports, as 
does Mexican credit – one of the most robust variables, being significant at 1 or 5 percent 
levels in all models. Chile and Mexico’s credit coefficients are quite similar between them 
in Model 2. Brazilian credit, however, shows the opposite sign, and it is interesting to go 
a bit deeper on the topic. Unfortunately, data identifying Brazilian credit by sector is 
unavailable before 2012. On Figure 9 we can see the share of total credit received by 
aggregate economic activity24, where the monthly series are quite stable during all the 
period. Well, the so called lower added value industry is by far the one which receives 
most credit, counting for more than half of total – the highest shares within it go to foods 
and to oil, alcohol and gas. Thus, it can be inferred that credit moved to previously 
established subsectors and has helped their consolidation, while Chilean and Mexican 
credit help diversification in some scale since their coefficients are positive, even if it 
goes to the sectors of higher export shares. In that sense, Brazilian credit – a powerful 
mechanism that could be used to exploit diversification – has helped to specialize, and 
not diversify, its export portfolio. This may also contribute to explain why Brazilian 
investment coefficient 
was positive in Model 3, 
although it has a negative 
sign in Brazilian Models 
A and C. However, the 
Mexican positive sign in 
its Model C cannot be 
 
24 Lower added value industry: packing; nondurable goods; sugar; textile, clothing, leather and 
footwear; paper and cellulose; metallurgy and steel and iron industry; foods; oil, alcohol and gas; and 
mining. 
Higher added value industry: chemical and pharmaceutical; capital good; durable goods; and 
automobile. 
Construction and Infrastructure only compute themselves and for these calculations SIUP (Industrial 
Services of Public Utility) was not considered, given it is not discriminated among sectors. However, even 
if all SIUP amount goes to higher added value industries, lower added value industries continue as the 
largest share. 
FIGURE 9 – Brazilian Credit 
Source: BCB (2019). Author’s own calculations 
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explained by theory or literature review and the lack of detailed data makes it difficult to 
investigate deeper. INEGI (2019) data about private investment in capital formation allow 
us to see not only the amount that is going to machinery, but also the economic activity 
it is related to. In the year 2012, for example, 43 percent of it went to manufacture and 23 
percent to mining (numbers that go along with a negative sign of the coefficient). Public 
investment data, however, are not as specific and do not differentiate manufacture from 
mining. Chile’s sign was negative, as expected. 
Brazilian and Chilean market openness is associated with specialization of exports as 
the models suggest. Indeed, it was seen premature deindustrialization and weakening, 
lack, and failure of industrial policies during the observed period, and their major exports’ 
shares went to commodities and primary goods after aggressive liberalization and trust in 
the market efficiency. Mexican results, however, are not so consensual. The first proxy 
for liberalized markets – international trade as percentage of GDP – shows a positive and 
weak correlation with Theil of 0,08, while the second proxy – effectively applied tariff 
weighted – has a negative and stronger one, of -0,3225. An interesting point: if the proxy 
1 correlation considers not 1990-2018, but 1992-2018 values, it goes to a much stronger 
level and reaches 0,65. In that sense, their coefficient signs were opposite, making it 
statistically coherent, but a difficult economic interpretation. After the dramatic fast Theil 
drop on 1990-1992, the Mexican exports kept specializing (Figure 6) as its international 
trade and FTA agreements grew (Figures 2 and 12). Therefore, as Brazilian and Chilean 
exports, proxy 1 captures this movements and says Mexico specializes as its trade 
liberalizes. Proxy 2 suggests the less tariff Mexico imposes, the more diversified it 
becomes, that is, the more liberalized its trade, the more diversified the export basket will 
be – the opposite of proxy 1 interpretation. Nevertheless, it is also understandable – the 
exports to USA weight altogether with NAFTA agreement probably shape this sign, as 
the USA has bought more diversified goods along this period. Indeed, it is undeniable 
that Mexican exports have become more diversified while the manufacture exports share 
grew.  
In sum, the majority of the results found in this chapter are in line with the literature, 
despite that fact that the former are from country specific models and the latter from panel 
 
25 All correlation values in this paragraph are from author’s own calculations. 
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data. Manufacture and commodities proxies were very robust, contributing to more and 
less diversification respectively, as in Osakwe & Kilolo (2018). Remoteness, also with 
robust and positive evidence, is similar to other investigations, such as Agosin et al 
(2011), Parteka & Tamberi (2011) and Cadot et al. (2011b). The negative sign of 
institution quality was the same for Osakwe et al. (2018) and Cadot et al. (2011b). With 
regard to education, the literature has shown a  negative sign, in works by as Agosin et 
al. (2011), Cadot et al. (2011b), and Osakwe et al. (2018), but this study found that this 
negative sign was robust only in the Chilean case. Contrary to Elhiraika & Mbate (2014), 
investment signs for Brazil and Mexico were found unexpectedly, while for Chile it was 
negative as literature suggests. For Agosin et al. (2011) credit and exchange rate did not 
affect diversification, and on this issue investigation has found robust evidence of REER 
and credit influence on Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican cases – they have showed the 
expected sign, but the Brazilian credit. Trade liberalization does not have a consensus on 
literature – Osakwe et al. (2018), Osakwe & Kilolo (2018) and Parteka & Tamberi (2011) 
consider it positive to diversification, while Agosin et al (2011) results suggest it leads to 
specialization and Cadot et al. (2011b) did not find any significance. For these South 
American countries trade liberalization had robust evidence in specializing the export 
basket, but for Mexico it is not so clear and there is a negative relation of effective 
weighted tariffs with Theil probably because of NAFTA. 
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4. FINAL REMARKS 
The purpose of this dissertation is to compare the realities of three major LAC, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico, taking into account that they have shown distinct paths in exports by 
sector, but also many similarities between them. The LA relative backwardness, a term 
postulated by Gerschenkron, is also noticed by the lack of its export stability and TOT 
deterioration, as Prebisch and Singer pointed out. Therefore, the established goal here 
was to identify some of the most relevant determinants for their export diversification, or 
lack of. The factors to test were chosen based on literature review from the countries’ 
specificities and export diversification broader literature. 
Even after the liberal and financial policies that promoted the premature 
deindustrialization in the 1990s, the largest LAC had the opportunity to change its 
production structure in the 2000s, but it did not. Over time, its export basket became more 
specialized, and when commodities prices fell in mid-2010s the hope for a fast change 
fell as well. China is now Brazilian largest importer and continues to demand 
commodities that Brazil can, and wants, to sell. To change this scope, Brazil can direct 
credit to industries other than mining and agriculture – and the Brazilian Development 
Bank certainly has the capacity to be a decisive instrument. Brazil’s main determinants 
for diversification were manufacture and institution quality, while for specialization, 
credit, REER, commodities, remoteness, and trade liberalization played an important role. 
It was in Chile that re-commoditization of exports occurred severally, and where 
industrial policies did not receive the attention that the country deserves and did not work 
out as expected. The copper price inflation, due to China’s 2000s growth, pushed aside 
the industrial projects and the Asian giant became the major Chilean exports destination. 
Since the 1990s, the country has joined many FTAs and its export basket specialized 
towards commodities. Trade liberalization had robust results of increasing the Theil, since 
both proxies captured this movement. All the significant variables’ signs are consistent 
with the literature review, which is a great additional value for this country’s literature. 
In sum, trade liberalization, commodities rents and REER were determinants of 
specialization, while manufacturing, education, investment and credit determined 
diversification. Although all its concentration indexes increased, the manufacture output 
did not stop growing during this time.  
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A diversified export basket secures a country of external vulnerabilities and is also 
related to some international influence. Asian growth in the second half of the last century 
is a perfect example: some countries were able to diversify their production and exports 
towards added value production and therefore, their influence and lack of external 
vulnerability were consequences. Mexico has indeed diversified its production and 
exports, but through NAFTA and maquiladoras. In that sense, Mexico has become a 
cheap place to produce and a path to many companies to be price-competitive in the North 
American market. It is like an adaptation of the center-periphery model and a 
reaffirmation of its dependence on the USA, and the review of the literature mentions 
those authors who agree with this. But it is worth  stressing that Mexico, by other means,  
can try to diversify its extensive margin exports considering that there are companies and 
manufacture production; initial fixed costs of industrialization have already been made; 
there is know-how at some considerable level; and that Mexico disposes of the main 
characteristics an emerging economy needs in order to make its path, such as the internal 
market. Its trade liberalization’s results were different in the two proxies, but as discussed, 
it has helped Mexico diversify through NAFTA agreement. Institutions, credit and 
manufacturing helps to diversify the Mexican exports, and REER, remoteness, 
commodities seem to specify it.  
In regard to the most relevant explanatory variable in terms of the coefficients’ 
absolute value, Brazil, Chile and Mexico are in the same page: manufacturing and 
commodities. Seen in these terms, and not forgetting the extensive margin, it is crucial 
that these three countries acknowledge the necessity to shift most of their production of 
primary goods to higher added value manufactured products in order to achieve a lower 
Theil and succeed in consolidating a stable international trade. 
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FIGURE 10 – Chile Manufactured Exports – value vs share 
 
FIGURE 11 – Main Export Destinations 
Source: UN Comtrade. Author’s own calculations. 
Source: UN Comtrade (2019). Author’s own calculations1.  
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The applied methodology is suggested by UN (2015), and the data retrieved from UN 
Comtrade (2019) and CEPII (2019) – trade and distance between countries respectively. 
If a country is physically close to its major export destinations, then the index tends to be 
lower. A higher index is associated with higher transportation costs, what makes more 
difficult to effectively respond to external shocks and, therefore, being an obstacle to the 
economy’s diversification. In short, remoteness is a structural obstacle to trade, 
potentially impeding exports.  
𝑅 = 100 ×  
ln (𝑑𝑖)− ln (𝑑min)
ln (𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥)− ln (𝑑min)






The cumulative share cannot exceed the market share threshold and consists of the 
sum of n partners’ distance times their share. UN (2015) suggests a market share threshold 
of 50 per cent that was applied to Brazil and Chile. Since Mexican exports are too 
concentrated, it had to be expanded to 90 per cent. Therefore, the calculated difference 
between the Mexican index and the other two countries tends to be conservative. 
If a country is landlocked or a small island, there is still another adjustment to be made, 
but since that is not the case it was not applied.  
 
Indexes of specialization 
All indexes were calculated by the author. Although HHI and Theil indexes can be 
found at UNCTAD and IMF respectively, the time series do not match the period studied 
on this dissertation. 
Data comes from UN Comtrade (2019) at the 4-digit level of Harmonized System 
classification (HS4) level of disaggregation. Osakwe & Kilolo (2018) chose HS6 
(disaggregation of richer information) and also some of their references, but the more 
disaggregated the data, the more it tends to appear diversified, since small variations of a 
certain product might be taken as a sign of diversification, as Agosin et al (2011) also 
account for.  
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Therefore, the indexes’ absolute values used here should not be directly compared to 
indexes from another source, as different levels of disaggregation will end up in unequal 
absolute values. All of them go in the same direction – the higher the value, the more 
specialized the export basket. 
Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index 
It is a commonly accepted market concentration index ranging between 0 and 1 and 
calculated as the formula below.  
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  
∑ (𝑥𝑘)









The broader the dataset, the lower the HHI, since a larger number of products 
generates lower individual shares. Therefore, HHI calculations from HS4 level of 
disaggregation is likely to be biased towards zero. Since the main objective is to compare 
the three countries, and the same methodology was applied to all three of them, the 
nominal value is not a concern per se. 
Theil Index 
The Theil Index considers the absolute values 𝑥𝑘 and the share that each product 
would have in case of a perfect diversification µ =
𝑋
𝑁
. Hence, the deviations from the 
mean are weighted by this same deviation log. It is not restricted between zero and one, 
and it smooths extremely skewed distributions.  













The Gini Index is usually calculated to identify income disparities, but its application 
to exports differences is not unusual and it consolidates the evidences brought by HHI 
and Theil (the usual export diversification indexes). It was calculated as the formula 
below, where µ is the arithmetic average of 𝑥. 
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𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  ∑






FIGURE 12 – Free Trade Agreements 
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FIGURE 13 – Independent Variables 
 
Source: OAS (2019). Author’s own development. 
1 European Free Trade Association: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland 
2 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom 
3 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
4 North American Free Trade Association: Mexico, Canada, and USA 
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Brazil – Models A, B and C respectively 
Model 1 – Brazil, Chile and Mexico respectively 
Model 2 – Brazil, Chile and Mexico respectively 
Model 3 – Brazil, Chile and Mexico respectively 
FIGURE 14 - Scatterplots – Regression Standardized Predicted Value vs Residual 
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Brazil – Models A, B and C respectively 
Chile – Models A, B and C respectively 
Chile – Models A, B and C respectively 
Mexico – Models A, B and C respectively 
FIGURE 15 - Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. SPSS 24 output. 
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Mexico – Models A, B and C respectively 
Model 1 – Brazil, Chile and Mexico respectively 
Model 2 – Brazil, Chile and Mexico respectively 
Model 3 – Brazil, Chile and Mexico respectively 
Source: Author’s own calculations. SPSS 24 output. 
